A World Of Diversity Essays - Sociology Of Culture, Chauvinism

A World of Diversity Ethnocentric, derived from the Greek words of Ethnos, meaning race, people or cultural group, and Kentrikos, meaning concentrated about or directed to a center is a word that greatly describes many cultures on this planet we call Earth . The official definition of Ethnocentric is " characterized or based on the attitude that ones own group is superior" or "having race as a central interest". There is a whole world of problems, politics, and, other cultures, but it seems that the average American's only interest is that of themselves. The reason I chose to focus more on the American being ethnocentric is because I have been exposed the most to this culture. Why is it that in most foreign countries being knowledgeable about world politics is just as important as their own culture's politics? America is the melting pot of the world with so many different cultures and we accept this variety into our country as we were accepted when our ancestors came over. Today I feel that people are arrogant towards those foreigners who don't wash away their former demeanor. Why don't we realize that we are so lucky to live in a secure and free country that should glorify diversity and not promote prejudice. When we make contact with people whose beliefs and cultural tradition challenge our own perspective most feel some sort of intimidation. Professor Michael Bond from Simon Fraser University quoted: the mere existence of different others is inherently threatening because they either implicitly or explicitly challenge the absolute validity of one's own perspective. According to this analysis, prejudice is a psychological inability to tolerate the existence of different others and results from a need to maintain absolute faith in one's own cultural world view". Ethnocentrism in my opinion is very ignorant, unintelligent, and closed minded in that your normal rituals may seem just as strange to other cultures, but are seen by them in a more understanding way. Ethnocentrism has been instilled in us since birth, learning to attach our selves to our cultural groups depending on them for comfort and a sense of safety. Piaget's theory on child development states that a child believes he is the center of the universe until he learns to "de-center" himself, i.e., he realizes that the world can be constructed from a number of different perspectives. This is when the child starts to care for others and takes a better understanding of respect and friendliness towards them. People as a whole in a way have to "de-center" their strong cultural beliefs, as well as the thought that their culture is the only one important enough to concern themselves with. American sociologist, political economist and the originator of the term ethnocentric, William Graham Sumner, in 1904 defined ethnocentrism as : the view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything and all others are scaled and rated, in reference to one's group. Each group thinks that its own folkways are the only right ones. And if it observes that other people have other folkways, these excite its scorn. Ethnocentrism may manifest itself in behavior such as warfare, attitudes of superiority, hostility, violence, discrimination, and verbal aggression. In the past, groups such as the Nazi's, the Crusaders and, the Muslims have waged wars and death over cultural and religious differences using ethnocentrism as there incentive. Hate groups are also formed on this notion believing that their religious or cultural group is superior to others when in reality their customs are simply different. I realize that we are all ethnocentric to varying degrees because we are born into a culture at birth and we cling to that culture as a

Emotional Poems for Veterans Day

Emotional Poems for Veterans Day When emotions take over, the poet within you often emerges. These Veterans Day excerpts from poems touch the heart and soul of every patriot. They will send chills down your spine. They bring the horror of war home. If you know a veteran, share these words to let them know their devotion to country is important and appreciated. Veterans Day Poems Stephen Crane War Is Kind Do not weep, babe, for war is kind.Because your father tumbles in the yellow trenches,Raged at his breast, gulped and died,Do not weep.War is kind. Philip Freneau On the Departure of the British From Charleston But fame is theirs - and future daysOn pillard brass shall tell their praise;Shall tell - when cold neglect is dead - These for their country fought and bled. Walt Whitman Leaves of Grass I saw battle-corpses, myriads of them,And the white skeletons of young men - I saw them;I saw the debris and debris of all the dead soldiers of the war;But I saw they were not as was thought;They themselves were fully at rest - they suffer’d not;The living remain’d and suffer’d  - the mother suffer’d,And the wife and the child, and the musing comrade suffer’d,And the armies that remain’d suffer’d. Edgar Guest The Things That Make a Soldier Great Endanger but that humble street whereon his children run,You make a soldier of the man who never bore a gun.What is it through the battle smoke the valiant soldier sees? John McCrae In Flanders Fields In Flanders fields the poppies blowBetween the crosses, row on row,That mark our place; and in the skyThe larks, still bravely singing, flyScarce heard amid the guns below. Li Po Nefarious War In the battlefield men grapple each other and die;The horses of the vanquished utter lamentable cries to heaven,While ravens and kites peck at human entrails,Carry them up in their flight, and hang them on the branches of dead trees. Rudyard Kipling Tommy Its Tommy this, and Tommy that,And chuck him out the brute,But its Savior of his Country,When the guns begin to shoot. Siegfried Sassoon Aftermath But the past is just the same - and War’s a bloody game...Have you forgotten yet?...Look down, and swear by the slain of the War that you’ll never forget. Wilfred Owen Anthem for Doomed Youth What passing-bells for these who die as cattle?Only the monstrous anger of the guns.Only the stuttering rifles’ rapid rattleCan patter out their hasty orisons. Alfred, Lord Tennyson The Charge of the Light Brigade Half a league, half a league,Half a league onward,All in the valley of DeathRode the six hundred.‘Forward, the Light Brigade!Charge for the guns!’ he said:Into the valley of DeathRode the six hundred. Elizabeth Barrett Browning Mother and Poet Dead! One of them shot by the sea in the east,And one of them shot in the west by the sea.Dead! both my boys! When you sit at the feastAnd are wanting a great song for Italy free,Let none look at me! Sophie Jewett Armistice We pray the fickle flag of truceStill float deceitfully and fair;Our eyes must love its sweet abuse;This hour we will not care,Though just beyond to-morrows gate,Arrayed and strong, the battle wait.

Business Ethics Problem Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Business Ethics Problem - Essay Example Therefore, employees should behave professionally and ethically in all situations because ethical behavior is the key to the resolution of complex issues. Hall (2011) states, â€Å"Ethics pertain to the principles of conduct that individuals use in making choices and guiding their behaviors in situations that involve the concepts of right and wrong† (p. 112). In this paper, I will relate an example of a U.S. software company where a customer confidence problem occurred between an employee from the programming department and a customer of the company. The base of the issue was less accounting knowledge of the software developer. Description of the Company The name of the company where the ethical issue arose is SyBase. The company belongs to the Computer Software industry and deals with the development of software products and applications. The company started its operations in 1984. The company has become one of the top software companies of the United States due to the qualit y of its products and services. The Ethical Issue An ethical issue occurred in SyBase in 2004. One day, a customer came to the customer service department and made a complaint about the accounting software that the company developed for him on request. He made a claim that the application had some errors because it was not giving correct results. The software was showing incorrect results for the calculations of Net Present Value, Internal Rate of Return, and some other calculations. He wanted to meet the software developer who developed that accounting software for him. When the customer services officer to whom the customer brought the issue contacted that database developer, he started making excuses and did not come to meet the customer. Upon telling the real situation to the developer, he asked the customer services officer to make the customer come after a week. The customer left the office and came again after a week to get the remodeled accounting software. When the customer services officer told the developer about the arrival of the customer, he asked him to apologize to the customer once more. The reason was that the developer was still not able to remove the errors. The customer became disappointed with the situation and asked the customer services officer to file a complaint to the manager of the programming department. When the manager investigated the issue, he came to know that the software developer was not able to fulfill the requirements of the customer due to which he was delaying the issue. The developer did not have a grip over complex accounting issues due to which he was not able to develop reliable accounting software for the customer. The ethical issue in this example was that the developer tried to hide his inability in removing the errors by delaying the issue. Individuals Involved in the Issue The individuals involved in the issue were the software developer, the manager of the programming department, and a regular customer of the company. Outcome of the Issue The issue not only decreased the customer’s confidence in the company but also resulted in putting a spot on the company’s image. The developer could have tackled the situation in a much different way. He should have made the company aware of the real situation instead of being afraid of losing his job. Recommendations for the company The manager of the

HDL 660 learder Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

HDL 660 learder - Essay Example His courage, intelligence, determination, and innovativeness are traits and skills that I admire. President Barrack Obama has been the most influential leader in my life due to his willingness to make hard decisions. He is a credible leader, committed, humorous, influential, and is trusted by many Americans to head the country. The most important trait is his ability to influence the people through his speech and decision making. I apply these lessons by being a committed, credible, available, and trustworthy group leader. Trait Assessment: Articulate= 4; perceptive= 5; Self-confident= 4; self-assured= 5; persistent= 3; determined= 5; trustworthy= 5; dependable= 4; friendly= 5; outgoing=4; conscientious= 3; diligent= 4; sensitive= 5; empathic= 4 (35). Skill Assessment: technical skill= 23; Human skill= 25; conceptual skill= 22 (64). Strong traits such as perception, determination, sensitivity, self-assurance, and trustworthiness are necessary to create a strong friendship with associates. Strong human skills are also necessary for effective interaction with others. These strong traits and skills have enabled me to become an influential and effective group leader. Improving conceptual skills and persistence are the most promising areas of improvement. These strengths will help improve self-expression and self-awareness necessary for authentic

Wk5 (31) Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Wk5 (31) - Essay Example Ethno centricity means that one observes a culture from the point of view of the culture and not necessarily from the point of view of one’s own culture. Lack of Cultural sensitivity can lead to stereotyping. The instance of this or the example of this is the point where people engage in stereotyping without sensitivity. Usually, we see Hollywood movies engage in stereotyping without cultural sensitivity and this often result in caricatures of the people being stereotyped. The stereotyping is more prevalent in popular culture and depictions of public images by generalizing the cultural and racial characteristics to include all members of the group. The skills that I would use include the usage of culture specific jargon and words to describe the culture in non stereotypical fashion. This can be done by an increased awareness of the culture of the others and by an effort and attempt to know the culture of the other without compromising on the factual element. The necessary pre-requisites for such skills would ensure that I can foster cultural sensitivity without engaging in stereotyping. The dimensions that Iveys identifies within the three organizing principles are perception of the self, aculturlization and style of personality. These are the organizing principles around which the concept of the verbal and non-verbal discrepancies is built. Each of the dimensions is important and a good point of study from the view point of observation and interviewing the subjects. The most important behavior to observe is that of the perception of the self as this is often a gateway into the future of the self as compared to the other dimensions that merely touch upon the fringes. The perception of the self is an important starting point for further analysis into the causes of what makes the people behave in a certain way. The specific examples for each kind of dimension are the ways in which the behaviors are influenced by the dimensions. The information

Social Class Is Form Of Social Stratification Sociology Essay

Social Class Is Form Of Social Stratification Sociology Essay Introduction: Social class is a form of social stratification which impacts on peoples lives either negatively or positively. It refers to wealth, education level, occupation and prestige of a particular group of people. Factors which are inter-connected include the gender, sexuality, race and abilities (McDowell et al., 2013). It is important that social class be understood in the context from which it originates, primarily due to factors which occur inter-connectedly as mentioned above. There are many concepts relating to social stratification, but for the purpose of this essay I will focus mainly on Karl Marxs conflict theory, supplemented by Max Webbers functionalist ideology. Similarly factors such as education and employment will be central in this essay. I believe that the acquisition of knowledge and prestige via employment plays an important role in defining an individuals lifestyle and subsequently their life chances. Body: It must be noted that most of the research done by Karl Marx was based on westernized capitalist societies and it is primarily due to this fact that his concept of conflict theory exists in an economic realm or context (Lenski, 2008). Marx demarcated class of people in terms of either lower, middle or upper class. In Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx refers to lower-class societies as the proletariat and the upper-class as the bourgeoisie. The proletariat are a class of people who do manual labour which requires no specific skill, or simply put, they are the working (blue-collar) section of society. The bourgeoisie employ the working class society in order to increase their capital (Mohandesi, 2013). It is interesting to note that the position an individual finds himself or herself relative to the above category, impacts on their life chances and thus their social class. According to Max Weber (Davidson, 2009) social class and a persons life chances are interdependent. In this se nse, the higher an individual is positioned in the social hierarchy (class) the better his or her life will be; the opposite occurs for those who are in a poorer position. Factors include becoming wealthier, increasing ones prestige, the acquisition of knowledge and the improvement of an individuals living conditions. These are known as social advancements or improvements. According to a research study by Jean Anyon (1980) educational opportunities vastly improved as the socio-economic conditions of a particular social group increased. Anyon (1980) in Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work found that schools were organised in a manner which reflects the social class of the families. Her results were derived from five schools which were broken down into working-class, middle-class, affluent professional and executive elite schools. Furthermore Anyon (1980) concludes that skills and knowledge which moves toward social power or prestige are obtainable to children from higher social groups but are inaccessible to the working class which are offered a practical curriculum. This study shows that the curriculum grooms children to fill an employment role suited to their social class or better put, so that the more challenging professions are occupied by the most skilled and talented individuals. In this sense, lower class schools educated individuals i n a manner which requires them to follow orders rather than use their own initiative and understanding of the work. The emphasis on individualism increases as the social class of the school increases. In my experience I concur with what Anyon has found because there exists numerous types of schools or institutions ranging from technical to managerial and professional. Examples are the Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town College and The University of the Western Cape. Marx also suggests that institutions are used to oppress the subordinates of a society, this statement coupled with Anyons research, displays a rather frightful image. Institutionally people are being transformed and socialized, from a young age, to follow the layers of strata found in society. Education ultimately leads to employment which in turn culminates in the acquisition of wealth or material property. According to Max Weber, the ownership of physical assets, which is obtained by means of production, creates unique characteristics in terms of the individuals life chances (Shortell, 2012). Furthermore, Weber believes that the ownership of property is central to class differences and in this case there will always be a relationship between employee and employer or property renter and property owner. In our modernized capitalist society empowered by neoliberalism, emphasis is placed on the acquisition of wealth thereby stratifying society into upper-class rich and the lower-class poor inhabitants. In this sense one can improve ones social class by increasing wealth and also the ownership of property-making this an open societal system (opposed to the system of slavery). Employment is therefore an opportunity to achieve wealth and increase status, however, inequalities o ccur whereby a bread baker (regardless of his skill) has less chances to improve his conditions than the owner of the bakery. Functionalists (Marxism) would argue that economic disparity benefits the majority of society and is also an essential element for the operation of society as a whole (Lenski, 2008). Conclusion: In my opinion, I see employment as the second phase in a three phase process in light of an individuals life chances. The first phase being education and the last being a successful business owner or CEO. As mentioned above, the level of education provided to individuals varies according to their socio-economic standing. This is the crux of my argument mainly due to the manner in which institutions shape society in preparation for their pre-planned future i.e. external forces of which they have no control over. A false consciousness thus exists in the open capitalist society whereby the proletariat is made to believe that they have equal opportunities to improve their life chances, when in actual fact their original social class serves as a key which only opens a limited number of doorways to success. Those who are endowed with a higher social class are granted unlimited opportunities to all elements of success, prestige, wealth, knowledge and ultimately advantages to better their li fes chances.

P.g. Wodehouse, His Life, And His Works :: essays research papers

Does an artist create a masterpiece without a source of inspiration? Does an architect construct a building without first looking at a blueprint? As with all great minds, writers also need a source of inspiration or a "Blueprint" for their literature. In the short story, "The Truth About George", author P.G. Wodehouse uses his own life experiences as a blueprint for creating George and the other characters in the story. There are influences from Wodehouse's childhood and his formative years in "The Truth about George", the story about a man named George struggling to find a cure for his speech impediment in order to win the affections of a woman. P(elham) G(renville) Wodehouse, "Plum" to his friends(Babuser 1248). Was born to a well-to-do family in Surrey, England on Ocotber 15, 1881 in Guildford, England. He was educated at Dulwich, London and started writing at a young age. By the end of his life, PG Wodehouse turned out more than ninety stories and fifty other miscellaneous pieces of works such as film scripts, etc. (Jasen 1). During his childhood P.G. Wodehouse was abandoned by his parents and lived with various relatives. Although, as David Damrosch notes, Wodehouse "always insisted that he had a happy childhood, including a relationship with a father who was 'normal as rice pudding'"(Damrosch 453). He moved from England to Hong Kong and to the United States. He was introduced and brought up by a variety of aunts, uncles, nannies, and schools. (Damrosch 453). He went through many things such as being captured by the Germans during WWII, where he made radio broadcasts in which he described his experiences as a prisoner and ridiculed his captors. (Bassett 1). After the war, Wodehouse moved to the United States, which he calls "the romance capital of the world" where he met his wife, Ethel Rowley (Babuser 1248). and settled, becoming a citizen in 1955. (Jasen 2). He lived out the rest of his life in Southampton, New York, where he wrote farces, short stories, and many other works of literature until his death on February 14, 1975. Wodehouse would later use his vast experiences to write his enormous collection of prose,etc. Wodehouse wrote many works of literature based on his life. He based his characters and stories around his own imagination. Evelyn Waugh writes that Wodehouse's characters are "creations of pure fancy" and that "it is all Mr.

Why L.A. Used as Setting for Most Disaster Movies.

HENOS WOLDE Instructor: STARR GOODE English 1 Essay 3 10/29/2012 Why L. A. used as setting for most disaster movies. Through decades of disaster films, Los Angeles has been targeted by aliens, toppled by temblors, sunken by tsunamis, leveled by lava, and a rogue tornado once took out the Hollywood sign. Even though in real life los angels is not such a disastrous it nonetheless faces constant destruction in movies, on television, and in books; in the collective imagination, the city burns and burns.Los angels is used as a setting for most disastrous movies because the city is home to Hollywood and the movie business, so the artists who write about, direct and execute mass destruction in Los Angeles are often intimately familiar with the territory and find it convenient to destroy los angels in their films. Los Angeles is a popular disaster movie locale because it is home of the entertainment capital of the world Hollywood, its famous landmarks, and its geography. Los Angeles is home to the entertainment capital of the world Hollywood, which explains why L. A. is often used as a setting for most disaster movies.To destroy a big city in movies takes a lot of time and work. It would make it even harder to travel far away to shoot these movies. To make the destruction look realistic, Hollywood movie makers have to work extra hard and film non stop making sure they get every little detail right. It would make it very challenging to film these movies far away from the studio. For these reason Hollywood apparently wants to destroy all of Los Angeles. For example, the city is going down in flames in DEMOLITION MAN, turned into an island in ESCAPE FROM L. A. , and obliterated in THE BIG ONE: THE GREAT LOS ANGELES EARTHQUAKE.Perhaps Hollywood has no particular malice toward Los Angeles but simply destroys it cinematically because â€Å"it’s there,† at hand, nearby, easy to drive to and blow up, burn down, and shake apart while the cameras roll. With these d isaster movies Hollywood has perfected the cinema of conspicuous destruction, certainly a defining aspect of American movie technology. Los Angeles is also a city filled with internationally recognized landmarks. The Hollywood sign, the Capitol Records building, City Hall and the skyscrapers of down town makes the movies convenient for cinematic shorthand.Almost everybody recognizes these landmarks and when they see it being destroyed in movies, it allows the scale of the disaster to strike the audience greatly. By far, L. A. ‘s biggest cinematic target is the famous nine-letter landmark perched in the Hollywood hills. When people see the Hollywood sign being destroyed by natural disaster or alien attack, the idea behind it is to exaggerates the power of the destruction and to shock viewers with a realistic image of these familiar monument’s falling apart. Apart from its landmarks, L. A. s a popular disaster-movie locale because of its geography. Sitting in a seismic zo ne on the western edge of the continent, it is surrounded by beaches, mountains and deserts. In real life, the city is subject to floods, fires, earthquakes and big waves, so seeing freeways collapse or Santa Monica swallowed up by the sea isn't such a stretch. Hollywood takes great advantage of these landmarks to destroy Los Angeles. Some People also love watching Los Angeles get destroyed because they believe It's nice to mess up the great weather and see it being destroyed by natural disasters.But regardless of the on screen devastation, Fire, earthquakes, floods, volcanos, and a few alien invasions have destroyed the City of Los Angeles. Even though 1000's of disastrous movies have been made in the City, these movies have made the City a Famous landmark. Ultimately, heaving destruction on Los Angeles also shows Hollywood's sense of humor and optimism. It's an odd kind of Western optimism where Los Angeles always seems to start over again, like a phoenix rising from its own destr uction.Los angeles also makes it easier for Hollywood actors to destroy it because of its geography and world wide recognized landmarks. L. A. is good at playing itself in film. It's a familiar face and it is always expected to get blown up and somehow miraculously reappear in the next summer blockbuster. Interestingly, there are always a few survivors in these films, along with a message of hope. Even thought Los Angeles is used as a setting of disaster in most of its movies, there's always hope for change and resurrection as well.

5 Coke vs Pepsi 21st Century Case Study

op y 9-702-442 REV: JANUARY 27, 2004 DAVID B. YOFFIE tC Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century For over a century, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola vied for â€Å"throat share† of the world’s beverage market. The most intense battles of the cola wars were fought over the $60-billion industry in the United States, where the average American consumed 53 gallons of carbonated soft drinks (CSD) per year. In a â€Å"carefully waged competitive struggle,† from 1975 to 1995 both Coke and Pepsi achieved average annual growth of around 10% as both U. S. nd worldwide CSD consumption consistently rose. According to Roger Enrico, former CEO of Pepsi-Cola: No The warfare must be perceived as a continuing battle without blood. Without Coke, Pepsi would have a tough time being an original and lively competitor. The more successful they are, the sharper we have to be. If the Coca-Cola company didn’t exist, we’d pray for someone to invent them. And o n the other side of the fence, I’m sure the folks at Coke would say that nothing contributes as much to the present-day success of the Coca-Cola company than . . . Pepsi. 1This cozy relationship was threatened in the late 1990s, however, when U. S. CSD consumption dropped for two consecutive years and worldwide shipments slowed for both Coke and Pepsi. In response, both firms began to modify their bottling, pricing, and brand strategies. They also looked to emerging international markets to fuel growth and broadened their brand portfolios to include non-carbonated beverages like tea, juice, sports drinks, and bottled water. Do As the cola wars continued into the twenty-first century, the cola giants faced new challenges: Could they boost flagging domestic cola sales?Where could they find new revenue streams? Was their era of sustained growth and profitability coming to a close, or was this apparent slowdown just another blip in the course of Coke’s and Pepsi’s e nviable performance? 1Roger Enrico, The Other Guy Blinked and Other Dispatches from the Cola Wars (New York: Bantam Books, 1988). ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Research Associate Yusi Wang prepared this case from published sources under the supervision of Professor David B.Yoffie. Parts of this case borrow from previous cases prepared by Professors David Yoffie and Michael Porter. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright  © 2002 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www. hbsp. harvard. edu.No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a s preadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 Economics of the U. S. CSD Industry Americans consumed 23 gallons of CSD annually in 1970 and consumption grew by an average of 3% per year over the next 30 years (see Exhibit 1).This growth was fueled by increasing availability as well as by the introduction and popularity of diet and flavored CSDs. Through the mid-1990s, the real price of CSDs fell, and consumer demand appeared responsive to declining prices. 2 Many alternatives to CSDs existed, including beer, milk, coffee, bottled water, juices, tea, powdered drinks, wine, sports drinks, distilled spirits, and tap water. Yet Americans drank more soda than any other beverage. At 60%-70% market share, the cola segment of the CSD industry maintained its dominance throughout the 1990s, followed by lemon/lime, citrus, pepper, root beer, orange, and other flavors. C CSD consisted of a flavor base, a sweetener, and carbonated water. Four major participants were involved in the production and distribution of CSDs: 1) concentrate producers; 2) bottlers; 3) retail channels; and 4) suppliers. 3 Concentrate Producers The concentrate producer blended raw material ingredients (excluding sugar or high fructose corn syrup), packaged it in plastic canisters, and shipped the blended ingredients to the bottler. The concentrate producer added artificial sweetener to make diet soda concentrate, while bottlers added sugar or high fructose corn syrup themselves.The process involved little capital investment in machinery, overhead, or labor. A typical concentrate manufacturing plant cost approximately $25 million to $50 million to build, and one plant could serve the entire U nited States. No A concentrate producer’s most significant costs were for advertising, promotion, market research, and bottler relations. Marketing programs were jointly implemented and financed by concentrate producers and bottlers. Concentrate producers usually took the lead in developing the programs, particularly in product planning, market research, and advertising.They invested heavily in their trademarks over time, with innovative and sophisticated marketing campaigns (see Exhibit 2). Bottlers assumed a larger role in developing trade and consumer promotions, and paid an agreed percentage—typically 50% or more—of promotional and advertising costs. Concentrate producers employed extensive sales and marketing support staff to work with and help improve the performance of their bottlers, setting standards and suggesting operating procedures.Concentrate producers also negotiated directly with the bottlers’ major suppliers—particularly sweetener and packaging suppliers—to encourage reliable supply, faster delivery, and lower prices. Do Once a fragmented business with hundreds of local manufacturers, the landscape of the U. S. soft drink industry had changed dramatically over time. Among national concentrate producers, CocaCola and Pepsi-Cola, the soft drink unit of PepsiCo, claimed a combined 76% of the U. S. CSD market in sales volume in 2000, followed by Cadbury Schweppes and Cott Corporation (see Exhibit 3).There were also private label brand manufacturers and several dozen other national and regional producers. Exhibit 4 gives financial data for Coke and Pepsi and their top affiliated bottlers. 2 Robert Tollison et al. , Competition and Concentration (Lexington Books, 1991), p. 11. 3 The production and distribution of non-carbonated soft drinks and bottled water will be discussed in a later section. 2 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century BottlersBottlers purchased concentrate, added carbonated water and high fructose corn syrup, bottled or canned the CSD, and delivered it to customer accounts. Coke and Pepsi bottlers offered â€Å"direct store door† (DSD) delivery, which involved route delivery sales people physically placing and managing the CSD brand in the store. Smaller national brands, such as Shasta and Faygo, distributed through food store warehouses. DSD entailed managing the shelf space by stacking the product, positioning the trademarked label, cleaning the packages and shelves, and setting up point-of-purchase displays and end-of-aisle displays.The importance of the bottler’s relationship with the retail trade was crucial to continual brand availability and maintenance. Cooperative merchandising agreements between retailers and bottlers were used to promote soft drink sales. Retailers agreed to specified promotional activity a nd discount levels in exchange for a payment from the bottler. tC The bottling process was capital-intensive and involved specialized, high-speed lines. Lines were interchangeable only for packages of similar size and construction.Bottling and canning lines cost from $4 million to $10 million each, depending on volume and package type. The minimum cost to build a small bottling plant, with warehouse and office space, was $25million to $35 million. The cost of an efficient large plant, with four lines, automated warehousing, and a capacity of 40 million cases, was $75 million in 1998. 4 Roughly 80-85 plants were required for full distribution across the United States. Among top bottlers in 1998, packaging accounted for approximately half of bottlers’ cost of goods sold, concentrate for one-third, and nutritive sweeteners for one-tenth. Labor accounted for most of the remaining variable costs. Bottlers also invested capital in trucks and distribution networks. Bottlers’ gross profits often exceeded 40%, but operating margins were razor thin. See Exhibit 5 for the cost structures of a typical concentrate producer and bottler. Do No The number of U. S. soft drink bottlers had fallen, from over 2,000 in 1970 to less than 300 in 2000. 6 Historically, Coca-Cola was the first concentrate producer to build nation-wide franchised bottling networks, a move that Pepsi and Cadbury Schweppes followed.The typical franchised bottler owned a manufacturing and sales operation in an exclusive geographic territory, with rights granted in perpetuity by the franchiser. In the case of Coca-Cola, territorial rights did not extend to fountain accounts—Coke delivered to its fountain accounts directly, not through its bottlers. The rights granted to the bottlers were subject to termination only in the event of default by the bottler. The original Coca-Cola franchise contract, written in 1899, was a fixed-price contract that did not provide for contract renegotiation even if ingredient costs changed.With considerable effort, often involving bitter legal disputes, Coca-Cola amended the contract in 1921, 1978, and 1987 to adjust concentrate price. By 1999, over 81% of Coke’s U. S. volume was covered by the 1987 Master Bottler Contract, which granted Coke the right to determine concentrate price and other terms of sale. Under the terms of this contract, Coke was not obligated to share advertising and marketing expenditures with the bottlers; however, the company often did in order to ensure quality and proper distribution of marketing.In 2000, Coke contributed $766 million in marketing support and $223 million in infrastructure support to its top bottler alone. The 1987 contract did not give complete pricing control to Coke, but rather used a pricing formula that adjusted quarterly for changes in sweetener prices and stated a maximum price. This contract differed from Pepsi’s Master Bottling Agreement with its top bottler, which gran ted the bottler 4 â€Å"Louisiana Coca-Cola Reveals Crown Jewel,† Beverage Industry, January 1999. 5 Calculated from M. Dolan et al. , â€Å"Coca-Cola Beverages,† Merrill Lynch Capital Markets, July 6, 1998. Timothy Muris et al. , Strategy, Structure, and Antitrust in the Carbonated Soft-Drink Industry, (Quorum Books, 1993), p. 63; John C. Maxwell, ed. Beverage Digest Fact Book 2001. 3 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 perpetual rights to distribute Pepsi cola products while at the same time required it to purchase its raw materials from Pepsi at prices, and on terms and conditions, determined by Pepsi.Pepsi negotiated concentrate prices with its bottling association, and normally based price increases on the CPI. Coke and Pepsi both raised concentrate prices throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, even as the real (inflation-ad justed) retail prices for CSD were down (see Exhibit 6). tC Coca-Cola and Pepsi franchise agreements allowed bottlers to handle the non-cola brands of other concentrate producers. Franchise agreements also allowed bottlers to choose whether or not to market new beverages introduced by the concentrate producer.Some restrictions applied, however, as bottlers could not carry directly competitive brands. For example, a Coca-Cola bottler could not sell Royal Crown Cola, but it could distribute Seven-Up, if it decided not to carry Sprite. Franchised bottlers had the freedom to participate in or reject new package introductions, local advertising campaigns and promotions, and test marketing. The bottlers also had the final say in decisions concerning retail pricing, new packaging, selling, advertising, and promotions in its territory, though they could only use packages authorized by the franchiser.In 1971, the Federal Trade Commission initiated action against eight major CPs, charging tha t exclusive territories granted to franchised bottlers prevented intrabrand competition (two or more bottlers competing in the same area with the same beverage). The CPs argued that interbrand competition was sufficiently strong to warrant continuation of the existing territorial agreements. After nine years of litigation, Congress enacted the â€Å"Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act† in 1980, preserving the right of CPs to grant exclusive territories. Retail Channels NoIn 2000, the distribution of CSDs in the United States took place through food stores (35%), fountain outlets7 (23%), vending machines (14%), convenience stores (9%), and other outlets (20%). Mass merchandisers, warehouse clubs, and drug stores made up most of the last category. Bottlers’ profitability by type of retail outlet is shown in Exhibit 7. Costs were affected by delivery method and frequency, drop size, advertising, and marketing. The main distribution channel for soft drinks was the superm arket. CSDs were among the five largest selling product lines sold by supermarkets, raditionally yielding a 15%-20% gross margin (about average for food products) and accounting for 3%-4% of food store revenues. 8 CSDs represented a large percentage of a supermarket’s business, and were also a big traffic draw. Bottlers fought for retail shelf space to ensure visibility and accessibility for their products, and looked for new locations to increase impulse purchases, such as placing coolers at checkout counters. The proliferation of products and packaging types created intense shelf space pressures.Do Discount retailers, warehouse clubs, and drug stores accounted about 15% of CSD sales in the late 1990s. These firms often had their own private label CSD, or they sold a generic label such as President’s Choice. Private label CSDs were usually delivered to a retailer’s warehouse, while branded CSDs were delivered directly to the store. With the warehouse delivery m ethod, the retailer was responsible for storage, transportation, merchandising, and stocking the shelves, thus incurring additional costs. The word â€Å"fountain outlets† traditionally referred to soda fountains, but was later used also for restaurants, cafeterias, and other establishments that served soft drinks by the glass using fountain dispensers. 8 Progressive Grocer 1998 Sales Manual Databook, July 1998, p. 68. 4 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century tC Historically, Pepsi had focused on sales through retail outlets, while Coke had dominated fountain sales. Coca-Cola had a 65% share of the fountain market in 2000, while Pepsi had 21%.Competition for fountain sales was intense. National fountain accounts were essentially â€Å"paid sampling,† with CSD companies earning pretax operating margins of around 2%. For restaurants, by contrast, fountain sales were extremely profitable—about 80 cents out of every dollar spent stayed with the restaurant retailers. In 1999, for example, Burger King franchisees were believed to pay about $6. 20 per gallon for Coke syrup, but they received a substantial rebate on each gallon in the form of a check; one large Midwestern Burger King franchisee said his annual rebate ran $1. 45 per gallon, or about 23%. Coke and Pepsi also invested in the development of fountain equipment, such as service dispensers, and provided their fountain customers with cups, point-of-sale material, advertising, and in-store promotions to increase brand presence. After Pepsi entered the fast-food restaurant business with the acquisitions of Pizza Hut (1978), Taco Bell (1986), and Kentucky Fried Chicken (1986), Coca-Cola persuaded other chains such as Wendy’s and Burger King to switch to Coke. PepsiCo spun its restaurant business off to the public in 1997 under the name Tricon, whi le retaining the Frito-Lay snack food business.In 2000, fountain â€Å"pouring rights† remained split along pre-Tricon lines, as Pepsi supplied all of Taco Bell’s and KFC’s, and the overwhelming majority of Pizza Hut restaurants. Coke retained exclusivity deals with McDonald’s and Burger King. No Coke and Cadbury Schweppes handled fountain accounts from their national franchisor companies. Employees of the franchisee companies negotiated and signed pouring rights contracts which, in the case of big restaurant chains, could cover the entire United States or even the world. The accounts were actually serviced by employees of the franchisors’ fountain divisions, local bottlers, or both.Local bottlers, when they were used, were paid service fees for delivering syrup and fixing and placing machines. Historically, PepsiCo could only sell directly to end-user national accounts. By 1999, Pepsi had persuaded most of its bottlers to modify their franchise ag reements to allow Pepsi to sell fountain syrup via restaurant commissary companies, which sell a range of supplies to restaurants. Concentrate producers offered bottlers rebates to encourage them to purchase and install vending machines. The owners of the property on which vending equipment was located usually received a sales commission.Coke and Pepsi were the largest suppliers of CSDs to the vending channel. Juice, tea, sports drinks, lemonade, and water were also available through vending machines. Suppliers to Concentrate Producers and Bottlers Do Concentrate producers required few inputs: the concentrate for most regular colas consisted of caramel coloring, phosphoric and/or citric acid, natural flavors, and caffeine. 10 Bottlers purchased two major inputs: packaging, which included $3. 4 billion in cans, $1. 3 billion in plastic bottles, and $0. 6 billion in glass; and sweeteners, which included $1. 1 billion in sugar and high fructose corn syrup, and $1. billion in artificial sweetener (predominantly aspartame). The majority of U. S. CSDs were packaged in metal cans (60%), then plastic bottles (38%), and glass bottles (2%). Cans were an attractive packaging material because they were easily handled, stocked, and displayed, weighed little, and were durable and recyclable. Plastic bottles, introduced in 1978, boosted home consumption of CSDs because of their larger 1-liter, 2-liter, and 3-liter sizes. Single-serve 20-oz. PET bottles quickly gained popularity and represented 35% of vended drinks and 3% of grocery drinks in 2000. Nikhil Deogun and Richard Gibson, â€Å"Coke Beats Out Pepsi for Contracts With Burger King, Domino’s,† The Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1999. 10 Based on ingredients lists, Coke Classic and Pepsi-Cola, 2001. 5 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 The concentrate producersâ₠¬â„¢ strategy towards can manufacturers was typical of their supplier relationships. Coke and Pepsi negotiated on behalf of their bottling networks, and were among the metal can industry’s largest customers.Since the can constituted about 40% of the total cost of a packaged beverage, bottlers and concentrate producers often maintained relationships with more than one supplier. In the 1960s and 1970s, Coke and Pepsi backward integrated to make some of their own cans, but largely exited the business by 1990. In 1994, Coke and Pepsi instead sought to establish stable long-term relationships with their suppliers. Major can producers included American National Can, Crown Cork & Seal, and Reynolds Metals. Metal cans were viewed as commodities, and there was chronic excess supply in the industry.Often two or three can manufacturers competed for a single contract. Early History11 tC The Evolution of the U. S. Soft Drink Industry Coca-Cola was formulated in 1886 by John Pemberton, a p harmacist in Atlanta, Georgia, who sold it at drug store soda fountains as a â€Å"potion for mental and physical disorders. † A few years later, Asa Candler acquired the formula, established a sales force, and began brand advertising of Coca-Cola. Tightly guarded in an Atlanta bank vault, the formula for Coca-Cola syrup, known as â€Å"Merchandise 7X,† remained a well-protected secret.Candler granted Coca-Cola’s first bottling franchise in 1899 for a nominal one dollar, believing that the future of the drink rested with soda fountains. The company’s bottling network grew quickly, however, reaching 370 franchisees by 1910. No In its early years, Coke was constantly plagued by imitations and counterfeits, which the company aggressively fought in court. In 1916 alone, courts barred 153 imitations of Coca-Cola, including the brands Coca-Kola, Koca-Nola, Cold-Cola, and the like. Coke introduced and patented a unique 6. 5ounce â€Å"skirt† bottle to be used by its franchisees that subsequently became an American icon.Robert Woodruff, who became CEO in 1923, began working with franchised bottlers to make Coke available wherever and whenever a consumer might want it. He pushed the bottlers to place the beverage â€Å"in arm’s reach of desire,† and argued that if Coke were not conveniently available when the consumer was thirsty, the sale would be lost forever. During the 1920s and 1930s, Coke pioneered open-top coolers to storekeepers, developed automatic fountain dispensers, and introduced vending machines. Woodruff also initiated â€Å"lifestyle† advertising for Coca-Cola, emphasizing the role of Coke in a consumer’s life.Do Woodruff also developed Coke’s international business. In the onset of World War II, at the request of General Eisenhower, he promised that â€Å"every man in uniform gets a bottle of Coca-Cola for five cents wherever he is and whatever it costs the company. † Beginnin g in 1942, Coke was exempted from wartime sugar rationing whenever the product was destined for the military or retailers serving soldiers. Coca-Cola bottling plants followed the movements of American troops; 64 bottling plants were set up during the war—largely at government expense.This contributed to Coke’s dominant market shares in most European and Asian countries. Pepsi-Cola was invented in 1893 in New Bern, North Carolina by pharmacist Caleb Bradham. Like Coke, Pepsi adopted a franchise bottling system, and by 1910 it had built a network of 270 11 See J. C. Louis and Harvey Yazijian, The Cola Wars (Everest House, 1980); Mark Pendergrast, For God, Country, and Coca-Cola (Charles Scribner’s, 1993); David Greising, I’d Like the World to Buy a Coke (John Wiley & Sons, 1997). 6 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. du or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century franchised bottlers. Pepsi struggled, however, declaring bankruptcy in 1923 and again in 1932. Business began to pick up in the midst of the Great Depression, when Pepsi lowered the price for its 12-ounce bottle to a nickel, the same price Coke charged for its 6. 5-ounce bottle. When Pepsi tried to expand its bottling network in the late 1930s, its choices were small local bottlers striving to compete with wealthy Coke franchisees. 12 Pepsi nevertheless began to gain market share.In 1938, Coke filed suit against Pepsi, claiming that Pepsi-Cola was an infringement on the CocaCola trademark. The court ruled in favor of Pepsi in 1941, ending a series of suits and countersuits between the two companies. With its famous radio jingle, â€Å"Twice as Much, for Nickel Too,† Pepsi’s U. S. sales surpassed those of Royal Crown and Dr Pepper in the 1940s, trailing only Coca-Cola. In 1950, Coke’s share of the U. S. CSD market was 47% and Pepsi’s was 10%; hundreds of r egional CSD companies continued to produce a wide assortment of flavors. tCThe Cola Wars Begin In 1950, Alfred Steele, a former Coca-Cola marketing executive, became Pepsi’s CEO. Steele made â€Å"Beat Coke† his theme and encouraged bottlers to focus on take-home sales through supermarkets. The company introduced the first 26-ounce bottles to the market, targeting family consumption, while Coke stayed with its 6. 5-ounce bottle. Pepsi’s growth soon began tracking the growth of supermarkets and convenience stores in the United States: There were about 10,000 supermarkets in 1945, 15,000 in 1955, and 32,000 at the peak in 1962.No In 1963, under the leadership of new CEO Donald Kendall, Pepsi launched its â€Å"Pepsi Generation† campaign that targeted the young and â€Å"young at heart. † Pepsi’s ad agency created an intense commercial using sports cars, motorcycles, helicopters, and a catchy slogan. The campaign helped Pepsi narrow Cokeâ€℠¢s lead to a 2-to-1 margin. At the same time, Pepsi worked with its bottlers to modernize plants and improve store delivery services. By 1970, Pepsi’s franchise bottlers were generally larger compared to Coke bottlers.Coke’s bottling network remained fragmented, with more than 800 independent franchised bottlers that focused mostly on U. S. cities of 50,000 or less. 13 Throughout this period, Pepsi sold concentrate to its bottlers at a price approximately 20% lower than Coke. In the early 1970s, Pepsi increased the concentrate price to equal that of Coke. To overcome bottlers’ opposition, Pepsi promised to use the extra margin to increase advertising and promotion. Do Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola began to experiment with new cola and non-cola flavors and a variety of packaging options in the 1960s.Before then, the two companies had adopted a single product strategy, selling only their flagship brand. Coke introduced Fanta (1960), Sprite (1961), and lowcalorie Tab (1 963). Pepsi countered with Teem (1960), Mountain Dew (1964), and Diet Pepsi (1964). Each introduced non-returnable glass bottles and 12-ounce metal cans in various packages. Coke and Pepsi also diversified into non-soft-drink industries. Coke purchased Minute Maid (fruit juice), Duncan Foods (coffee, tea, hot chocolate), and Belmont Springs Water.Pepsi merged with snackfood giant Frito-Lay in 1965 to become PepsiCo, claiming synergies based on shared customer targets, store-door delivery systems, and marketing orientations. In the late 1950s, Coca-Cola, still under Robert Woodruff’s leadership, began using advertising that finally recognized the existence of competitors, such as â€Å"American’s Preferred Taste† (1955) and â€Å"No Wonder Coke Refreshes Best† (1960). In meetings with Coca-Cola bottlers, however, executives only discussed the growth of their own brand and never referred to its closest competitor by name. 2 Louis and Yazijian, p,. 23. 13 Pe ndergrast, p. 310. 7 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 During the 1960s, Coke primarily focused on overseas markets, apparently believing that domestic soft drink consumption had neared saturation at 22. 7 gallons per capita in 1970. 14 Pepsi meanwhile battled aggressively in the United States, doubling its share between 1950 and 1970. The Pepsi ChallengeIn 1974, Pepsi launched the â€Å"Pepsi Challenge† in Dallas, Texas. Coke was the dominant brand in the city and Pepsi ran a distant third behind Dr Pepper. In blind taste tests hosted by Pepsi’s small local bottler, the company tried to demonstrate that consumers in fact preferred Pepsi to Coke. After its sales shot up in Dallas, Pepsi started to roll out the campaign nationwide, although many of its franchise bottlers were initially reluctant to join. tC Coke countered with rebates, rival claims, retail price cuts, and a series of advertisements questioning the tests’ validity.In particular, Coke used retail price discounts selectively in markets where the Coke bottler was company owned and the Pepsi bottler was an independent franchisee. Nonetheless, the Pepsi Challenge successfully eroded Coke’s market share. In 1979, Pepsi passed Coke in food store sales for the first time with a 1. 4 share point lead. Breaking precedent, Brian Dyson, president of Coca-Cola, inadvertently uttered the name â€Å"Pepsi† in front of Coke’s bottlers at the 1979 bottlers conference. No During the same period, Coke was renegotiating its franchise bottling contract to obtain greater flexibility in pricing concentrate and syrups.Bottlers approved the new contract in 1978 only after Coke conceded to link concentrate price changes to the CPI, adjust the price to reflect any cost savings associated with a modification of ingredients, and supply unsw eetened concentrate to bottlers who preferred to purchase their own sweetener on the open market. 15 This brought Coke’s policies in line with Pepsi, which traditionally sold its concentrate unsweetened to its bottlers. Immediately after securing bottler approval, Coke announced a significant concentrate price hike. Pepsi followed with a 15% price increase of its own. Cola Wars Heat UpIn 1980, Cuban-born Roberto Goizueta was named CEO and Don Keough president of Coca-Cola. In the same year, Coke switched from sugar to the lower-priced high fructose corn syrup, a move Pepsi emulated three years later. Coke also intensified its marketing effort, increasing advertising spending from $74 million to $181 million between 1981 and 1984. Pepsi elevated its advertising expenditure from $66 million to $125 million over the same period. Goizueta sold off most of the non-CSD businesses he had inherited, including wine, coffee, tea, and industrial water treatment, while keeping Minute Mai d. DoDiet Coke was introduced in 1982 as the first extension of the â€Å"Coke† brand name. Much of CocaCola management referred to its brand as â€Å"Mother Coke,† and considered it too sacred to be extended to other products. Despite internal opposition from company lawyers over copyright issues, Diet Coke was a phenomenal success. Praised as the â€Å"most successful consumer product launch of the Eighties,† it became within a few years not only the nation’s most popular diet soft drink, but also the third-largest selling soft drink in the United States. 14 Maxwell. 15 Pendergrast, p. 323. 8 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.[email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century In April 1985, Coke announced the change of its 99-year-old Coca-Cola formula. Explaining this radical break with tradition, Goizueta saw a sharp depreciation in the value of the Coca-Cola trademark as â€Å"the product had a declining share in a shrinking segment of the market. †16 On the day of Coke’s announcement, Pepsi declared a holiday for its employees, claiming that the new Coke tasted more like Pepsi. The reformulation prompted an outcry from Coke’s most loyal customers.Bottlers joined the clamor. Three months later, the company brought back the original formula under the name Coca-Cola Classic, while retaining the new formula as the flagship brand under the name New Coke. Six months later, Coke announced that Coca-Cola Classic (the original formula) would henceforth be considered its flagship brand. tC New CSD brands proliferated in the 1980s. Coke introduced 11 new products, including Cherry Coke, Caffeine-Free Coke, and Minute-Maid Orange. Pepsi introduced 13 products, including Caffeine-Free Pepsi-Cola, Lemon-Lime Slice, and Cherry Pepsi.The number of packaging types and sizes also increased dramatically, and the battle for shelf spac e in supermarkets and other food stores grew fierce. By the late 1980s, both Coke and Pepsi offered more than ten major brands, using at least seventeen containers and numerous packaging options. 17 The struggle for market share intensified and the level of retail price discounting increased sharply. Consumers were constantly exposed to cents-off promotions and a host of other supermarket discounts. No Throughout the 1980s, the smaller concentrate producers were increasingly squeezed by Coke and Pepsi.As their shelf-space declined, small brands were shuffled from one owner to another. Over five years, Dr Pepper was sold (all and in part) several times, Canada Dry twice, Sunkist once, Shasta once, and A&W Brands once. Some of the deals were made by food companies, but several were leveraged buyouts by investment firms. Philip Morris acquired Seven-Up in 1978 for a big premium, but despite superior brand rankings and established distribution channels, racked up huge losses in the earl y 1980s and exited in 1985. (Exhibit 8a shows the brand performance of top companies, as ranked by retailers. )In the 1990s, through a series of strategic acquisitions, Cadbury Schweppes emerged as the clear (albeit distant) third-largest concentrate producer, snapping up the Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Companies (1995) and Snapple Beverage Group (2000). (Appendix A describes Cadbury Schweppes’ operations and financial performance. ) Bottler Consolidation and Spin-Off Do Relations between Coke and its franchised bottlers had been strained since the contract renegotiation of 1978. Coke struggled to persuade bottlers to cooperate in marketing and promotion programs, upgrade plant and equipment, and support new product launches. 8 The cola wars had particularly weakened small independent franchised bottlers. High advertising spending, product and packaging proliferation, and widespread retail price discounting raised capital requirements for bottlers, while lowering their margins. Many b ottlers that had been owned by one family for several generations no longer had the resources or the commitment to be competitive. At a July 1980 dinner with Coke’s fifteen largest domestic bottlers, Goizueta announced a plan to refranchise bottling operations. Coke began buying up poorly managed bottlers, infusing capital, 6 The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1986. 17 Timothy Muris, David Scheffman, and Pablo Spiller, Strategy, Structure, and Antitrust in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry. (Quorum Books, 1993), p. 73. 18 Greising, p. 88. 9 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 and quickly reselling them to better-performing bottlers. Refranchising allowed Coke’s larger bottlers to expand outside their traditionally exclusive geographic territories.When two of its largest bottling companies came up for sale in 1985, Coke moved sw iftly to buy them for $2. 4 billion, preempting outside financial bidders. Together with other bottlers that Coke had recently bought, these acquisitions placed one-third of Coca-Cola’s volume in company-owned bottlers. In 1986, Coke began to replace its 1978 franchise agreement with the Master Bottler Contract that afforded Coke much greater freedom to change concentrate price. tC Coke’s bottler acquisitions had increased its long-term debt to approximately $1 billion.In 1986, on the initiative of Doug Ivester, who later became CEO, the company created an independent bottling subsidiary, Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCE), and sold 51% of its shares to the public, while retaining the rest. The minority equity position enabled Coke to separate its financial statements from CCE. As Coke’s first so-called â€Å"anchor bottler,† CCE consolidated small territories into larger regions, renegotiated with suppliers and retailers, merged redundant distribution and mater ial purchasing, and cut its work force by 20%. CCE moved towards mega-facilities, investing in 50 million-case production lines with high levels of automation.Coke continued to acquire independent franchised bottlers and sell them to CCE. 19 â€Å"We became an investment banking firm specializing in bottler deals,† reflected Don Keough. In 1997 alone, Coke put together more than $7 billion in deals involving bottlers. 20 By 2000, CCE was Coke’s largest bottler with annual sales of more than $14. 7 billion, handling 70% of Coke’s North American volume. Some industry observers questioned Coke’s accounting practice, as Coke retained substantial managerial influence in its arguably independent anchor bottler. 21 NoIn the late 1980s, Pepsi also acquired MEI Bottling for $591 million, Grand Metropolitan’s bottling operations for $705 million, and General Cinema’s bottling operations for $1. 8 billion. The number of Pepsi bottlers decreased from mo re than 400 in the mid-1980s to less than 200 in the mid-1990s. Pepsi owned about half of these bottling operations outright and held equity positions in most of the rest. Experience in the snack food and restaurant businesses boosted Pepsi’s confidence in its ability to manage the bottling business. In the late 1990s, Pepsi changed course and also adopted the anchor bottler model.In April 1999, the Pepsi Bottling Group (PBG) went public, with Pepsi retaining a 35% equity stake. By 2000, PBG produced 55% of PepsiCo beverages in North America and 32% worldwide. As Craig Weatherup, PBG’s chairman/CEO, explained, â€Å"Our success is interdependent, with PepsiCo the keeper of the brands and PBG the keeper of the marketplace. In that regard, we’re joined at the hip. †22 Do The bottler consolidation of the 1990s made smaller concentrate producers increasingly dependent on the Pepsi and Coke bottling network to distribute their products. In response, Cadbury Sc hweppes in 1998 bought and merged two large U.S. bottlers to form its own bottler. In 2000, Coke’s bottling system was the most consolidated, with its top 10 bottlers producing 94% of domestic volume. Pepsi’s and Cadbury Schweppes’ top 10 bottlers produced 85% and 71% of the domestic volume of their respective franchisors. 19 Greising, p. 292. 20 Beverage Industry, January 1999, p. 17. 21 Albert Meyer and Dwight Owsen, â€Å"Coca-Cola’s Accounting,† Accounting Today, September 28, 1998 22 Kent Steinriede, â€Å"PBG Charts Its Own Course,† Beverage Industry, May 1, 1999. 10 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.[email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Adapting to the Times 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century In the late 1990s, a variety of problems began to emerge for the soft drink industry as a whole. Although Americans still drank more CSDs than any other beverage, U. S. sales volume registered only a 0. 2% increase in 2000, to just under 10 billion cases (a case was equivalent to 24 eight-ounce containers, or 192 ounces). This slow growth was in contrast to the 5%-7% annual growth in the United States during the 1980s.Concurrently, financial crisis in various parts of the world left Coke and Pepsi bottlers over-invested and under-utilized. tC Coca-Cola was also impacted by difficulties in leadership transition. After the death of the popular CEO Roberto Goizueta in 1997, his successor Douglas Ivestor had two rocky years at the helm, during which Coke faced a high-profile race discrimination suit and a European public relations scandal after hundreds of people became ill from contaminated soft drinks. Douglas Daft assumed leadership in April 2000; one of his first moves was to lay off 5,200 employees, or 20% of worldwide staff.While expressing â€Å"enthusiastic support for the current strategic course of the Company under Doug Daft’s leadership,à ¢â‚¬  Coke’s Board voted against Daft’s eleventh-hour negotiations to acquire Quaker Oats in November 2000. As they had numerous times over the last century, analysts predicted the end of Coke and Pepsi’s stellar growth and profitability. Meanwhile, Coke and Pepsi turned their attention to bolstering domestic markets, diversifying into non-carbonated beverages (non-carbs), and cultivating international markets.Balancing Market Growth, Market Share, and Profitability in the United States No During the early 1990s, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo bottlers employed a low-price strategy in the supermarket channel in order to compete more effectively with high-quality, low-price store brands. As the threat of the low-priced brands lessened, CCE responded in March 1999 with its first major price increase at the retail level after 20 years of flat take-home pricing. Its strategy was to reposition Coke Classic as a premium brand. PBG followed that price increase shortly after. P rice wars had driven soda prices down to the point where bottlers couldn’t get a decent return on supermarket sales,† explained a Pepsi executive. 23 Observed one industry analyst, â€Å"Coke’s growth is coming internationally, and Pepsi’s is coming from Frito-Lay. It is in the companies’ mutual best interest not to destroy the domestic market and eat up each other’s share. † 24 Consumers’ initial reaction to price increases was a reduction in supermarket purchases. When CCE raised prices in supermarkets by 6. 0%-8. 0% in both 1999 and 2000, comparable volumes in North America declined each year (1. % in 1999 and 0. 8% in 2000). In 2001, however, the bottling companies effected more moderate price increases and consumer demand appeared to be on the upswing. Do Both Coke and Pepsi also set about to boost the flagging cola market in other ways, including exclusive marketing agreements with Britney Spears (Pepsi) and Harry Potter ( Coke). Pepsi reintroduced the highly effective â€Å"Pepsi Challenge,† which was designed to boost overall cola sales and draw consumers away from private labels as much as it was to plug Pepsi over Coke.In contrast to the supermarket channel, Coke and Pepsi’s rivalry in the fountain channel intensified in the late 1990s. To penetrate Coke’s stronghold, Pepsi aggressively pursued national 23 Lauren R. Rublin, â€Å"Chipping Away: Coca-Cola Could Learn a Thing or Two from the Renaissance at PepsiCo,† Barron’s, June 12, 2000. 24 Rublin. 11 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 accounts, forcing Coke to make costly concessions to retain its biggest customers.Pepsi broke Coke’s stronghold at Disney with a 1998 contract to supply soft drinks at the new DisneyQuest, Club Disney and ESPN Zone chains. After a h eated bidding war in 1999 over the 10,000-store chain of Burger King Corporation, Coke again won the fountain contract involving $220 million per year for 40 million gallons of syrup soda, but only after agreeing to double its $25 million in rebates to the food chain. Pepsi also sued Coke over access to the fountain market, charging Coke with â€Å"attempting to monopolize the market for fountain-dispensed soft drinks through independent foodservice distributors throughout the United States. Coke persuaded a Federal court to dismiss the suit in 2000. Despite Pepsi’s efforts, at the end of 2000, Coke still dominated the fountain market with 65% share of national â€Å"pouring rights† to Pepsi’s 21% and Dr Pepper/Seven Up’s 14%. tC The Rise of Non-Cola Beverages As consumer trends shifted from diet soda, to lemon-lime, to tea-based drinks, to other popular non-carbs, Coke and Pepsi vigorously expanded their brand portfolios. Each new product was accompanie d by debate on how much each company should stray from its core product: regular cola.On one hand, cola sales consistently dwarfed alternative beverages sales, and cola-defenders expressed concern that over-enthusiastic expansion would distract the company from its flagship product. Also, history had shown that explosions in demand for alternative drinks were regularly followed by slow or negative growth. On the other hand, as domestic cola demand appeared to plateau, alternative beverages could provide a growth engine for the firms. No By the late 1990s, the soft drink industry had seen various alternative beverage categories come and go.From double-digit expansion in the late 1980s, diet CSDs peaked in 1991 at 29. 8% of the CSD segment and then declined to their 1988-level share of 24. 4% in 1999. PepsiCo’s introduction of Pepsi One in late 1998 was partially responsible for the minor recovery of the diet drink segment. Flavored soft drinks such as citrus, lemon-lime, peppe r, and root beer were also popular. In 1999, Mountain Dew grew faster than any other CSD brand for the third year in a row, posting 6. 0% volume growth, but in 2000, its growth slowed to 1. 5% due to competing â€Å"new-age† non-carbs. DoAt the turn of this century, CSDs accounted for 41. 3% of total non-alcoholic beverage consumption, bottled water accounted for 10. 3%, and other non-carbs accounted for the remainder. 25 When measured in gallons, sales of non-carbs rose by 18% in 1995 and 5% in 2000, compared to 3% and 0. 2% respectively for CSDs. The drinks with high growth and high hype were non-carbs such as juices/juice drinks, sports drinks, tea-based drinks, dairy-based drinks—and especially bottled water. In the 1990s, the bottled water industry grew on average 8. 3% per year, and volume reached more than 5 billion gallons in 2000.Revenue growth outpaced volume growth, with a 9. 3% increase to approximately $5. 6 billion, and per capita consumption gained 5. 1 gallons to 13. 2 gallons per person. Pepsi’s Aquafina went national in 1998. Coke followed in 1999 with Dasani. Though Pepsi and Coke sold reverse-osmosis purified water instead of spring water, they had a distribution advantage over competing water brands. 26 Coke and Pepsi launched other new drinks throughout the 1990s. They also aggressively acquired brands that rounded out their portfolios, including Tropicana (Pepsi, 1998), Gatorade (Pepsi, 5 Maxwell. Does not include â€Å"tap water / hybrids / all others† category. 26 Reverse osmosis is a method of producing pure water by forcing saline or impure water through a semi-permeable membrane across which salts or impurities cannot pass. 12 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century 2000), and SoBe (Pepsi, 2000). Both companies predicted that future increases in market share would come from beverages other than CSDs.Pepsi pronounced itself a â€Å"total beverage company,† and Coca-Cola appeared to be moving in the same direction, recasting its performance metric from share of the soda market to â€Å"share of stomach. † â€Å"If Americans want to drink tap water, we want it to be Pepsi tap water,† said Pepsi’s vice-president for new business, describing the philosophy behind the new strategy. 27 Coke’s Goizueta had echoed the same view: â€Å"Sometimes I think we even compete with soup. †28 Though cola remained the clear leader in terms of both companies’ volume sales, both Coke and Pepsi relied heavily on non-carbs to stimulate their overall growth in the late 1990s.In 1999, non-carbs accounted for 80% of Pepsi’s and more than 100% of Coke’s growth. 29 tC At the turn of the century, Pepsi had the lion’s share of non-CSD sales. Pepsi led Coke by a wide margin in 2000 volume sales in three key s egments: Gatorade (76%) led PowerAde (15%) in the $2. 6billion sports drinks segment, Lipton (38%) led Nestea (27%) in the $3. 5-billion tea-based drinks segment, and Aquafina (13%) led Dasani (8%) in the $6. 0-billion bottled water segment. 30 Including multi-serve juices, Tropicana held an approximate 44% share of the $3-billion chilled orange juice market, more than twice that of Minute Maid. 1 With the acquisition of Quaker and South Beach Beverages, Pepsi raised its non-carb market share to 31%, to Coke’s 19% (see Exhibit 8b). No Non-CSD beverages complicated Coke’s and Pepsi’s traditional production and distribution processes. While bottlers could easily manage some types of alternative beverages (e. g. , cold-filled Lipton Brisk), other types required costly new equipment and changes in production, warehousing, and distribution practices (e. g. , hot-filled Lipton Iced Tea). In many cases, Coke and Pepsi paid more than half the cost of these investments.T he few bottlers that invested in these capabilities either purchased concentrate or other additives from Coke and Pepsi (e. g. , Dasani’s mineral packet) or compensated the franchiser through per-unit royalty fees (e. g. , Aquafina). Most bottlers, however, did not invest in hot-fill (for some iced tea), reverse-osmosis (for some bottled water), or other specialized equipment, and instead bought their finished product from a central regional plant or one owned directly by Coca-Cola or PepsiCo. They would then distribute these alongside their own bottled products at a percentage mark-up.More split pallets32 led to slightly higher labor costs, but otherwise did not significantly affect distribution practices. Despite these complicated and evolving arrangements, higher retail prices for alternative beverages meant that margins for the franchiser, bottler, and distributor were consistently higher than on CSDs. Internationalizing the Cola Wars Do As domestic demand appeared to pla teau, Coke and Pepsi increasingly looked overseas for new growth. Throughout the 1990s, new access to markets in China, India, and Eastern Europe stimulated some of the most intense battles of the cola wars.In many international markets, per capita consumption levels remained a fraction of those in the United States. For example, while the 27 Marcy Magiera, â€Å"Pepsi Moving Fast To Get Beyond Colas,† Advertising Age, July 5, 1993. 28 Greising, p. 233. 29 Bonnie Herzog, â€Å"PepsiCo, Inc. : The Joy of Growth,† Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation, September 8, 2000. 30 Maxwell, p. 152-3. 31 Betsy McKay, â€Å"Juiced Up: Pepsi Edges Past Coke, and It has Nothing to Do With Cola,† The Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2000. 32 Pallets are hard beds, usually of wood, used to organize, store, and transport products.A split pallet carries more than one product type. 13 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783 -7860. Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century op y 702-442 average American drank 874 eight-ounce cans of CSDs in 1999, the average Chinese drank 22. In 1999, Coke held a world market share of 53%, compared to Pepsi’s 21% and Cadbury Schweppes’ 6%. Among major overseas markets, Coke dominated in Western Europe and much of Latin America, while Pepsi had marked presence in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (see Exhibit 9). C By the end of World War II, Coca-Cola was the largest international producer of soft drinks. Coke steadily expanded its overseas operations in the 1950s, and the name Coca-Cola soon became a synonym for American culture. Coke built brand presence in developing markets where soft drink consumption was low but potential was large, such as Indonesia: With 200 million inhabitants, a median age of 18, and per capita consumption of 9 eight-ounce cans of soda a year, one Coke executive noted that â€Å"they sit squarely on the equa tor and everybody’s young. It’s soft drink heaven. 33 By the early 1990s, Coke’s CEO Roberto Goizueta said, â€Å"Coca-Cola used to be an American company with a large international business. Now we are a large international company with a sizable American business. †34 No Following Coke, Pepsi entered Europe soon after World War II, and—benefiting from Arab and Soviet exclusion of Coke—into the Middle East and Soviet bloc in the early 1970s. However, Pepsi put less emphasis on its international operations during the subsequent decade. In 1980, international sales accounted for 62% of Coke’s soft drink volume, versus 20% for Pepsi.Pepsi rejoined the international battles in the late 1980s, realizing that many of its foreign bottling operations were inefficiently run and â€Å"woefully uncompetitive. †35 In the early 1990s, Pepsi utilized a niche strategy which targeted geographic areas where per capitas were relatively establis hed and the markets presented high volume and profit opportunities. These were often â€Å"Coke fortresses,† and Pepsi put its guerilla tactics to work, noting that â€Å"as big as Coca-Cola is, you certainly don’t want a shootout at high noon,† said Wayne Calloway, then CEO of PepsiCo. 6 Coke struck back; in one high-profile coup in 1996, Pepsi’s longtime bottler in Venezuela defected to Coke, temporarily reducing Pepsi’s 80% share of the cola market to nearly nothing overnight. In the late 1990s, Pepsi moved even further away from head-to-head competition and instead concentrated on emerging markets that were still up for grabs. â€Å"We kept beating our heads in markets that Coke won 20 years ago,† explained Calloway’s successor, Roger Enrico. â€Å"That is a very difficult proposition. 37 In 1999, PepsiCo’s bottler sales were up 5% internationally and its operating profit from overseas was up 37%. Market share gains were r eported in most of Pepsi-Cola International’s top 25 markets, including increases of 10% in India, 16% in China, and more than 100% in Russia. By 2000, international sales accounted for 62% of Coke’s and 9% of Pepsi’s revenues. Do Concentrate producers encountered various obstacles in international operations, including cultural differences, political instability, regulations, price controls, advertising restrictions, foreign exchange controls, and lack of infrastructure.When Coke attempted to acquire Cadbury Schweppes’ international practice, for example, it ran into regulatory roadblocks in Europe and in Mexico and Australia, where Coke’s market shares exceed 50%. On the other hand, Japanese domestic-protection price controls in the 1950s greased the skids for Coke’s high concentrate prices and high profitability, and in India, mandatory certification for bottled drinking water caused several local brands to fold. 33 John Huey, â€Å"The World’s Best Brand,† Fortune, May 31, 1993. 34John Huey, â€Å"The World’s Best Brand,† Fortune, May 31, 1993. 5 Larry Jabbonsky, â€Å"Room to Run,† Beverage World, August 1993. 36The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1991. 37 John Byrne, â€Å"PepsiCo’s New Formula: How Roger Enrico is Remaking the Company†¦ and Himself,† BusinessWeek, April 10, 2000. 14 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 op y Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century To cope with immature distribution networks, Coke and Pepsi created their own ground-up, and often novel, systems.Coke introduced vending machines to Japan, a channel that eventually accounted for more than half of Coke’s Japanese sales. 38 In India, Pepsi found the most prominent businessman in town and gave him exclusive distribution rights, tapping his connections to drive growth. Significantly, b oth Coke and Pepsi recognized local-market demands for non-cola products. In 2000, Coke carried more than 200 brands in Japan alone, most of which were teas, coffees, juices, and flavored water.In Brazil, Coke offered two brands of guarana, a popular caffeinated carbonated berry drink accounting for one-quarter of that country’s CSD sales, despite rivals’ TV ads ridiculing â€Å"gringo guarana. † tC When the economy foundered in certain parts of the world during the late 1990s, annual consumption declined in many regions. Major financial quakes in East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999 shook the cola giants, who had invested heavily in bottler infrastructure. From 1995 to 2000, Coke’s top line slowed to an average annual growth of less than 3%.Profits actually fell from $3. 0 billion in 1995 to $2. 2 billion in 2000. In Russia, where Coke invested more than $700 million from 1991 to 1999, the collapse of the economy caused sales to drop by a s much as 60% and left Coke’s seven bottling plants operating at 50% capacity. In Brazil, its third-largest market, Coke lost more than 10% of its 54% market share to low-cost local drinks produced by family-owned bottlers exempt from that country’s punitive soft-drink taxes. In 1998, Coke estimated that a strong dollar cut into net sales by 9%.Pepsi, with its relatively lower overseas presence, was less affected by the crises. Nonetheless, Pepsi also subsidized its bottlers while experiencing a drop in sales. No Despite these financial setbacks, both Coke and Pepsi expressed confidence in the future growth of international consumption and used the downturn as an opportunity to snatch up bottlers, distribution, and even rival brands. To increase sales, they tried to make their products more affordable through measures such as refundable glass packaging (instead of plastic) and cheaper 6. ounce bottles. The End of an Era? At the turn of the century, growth of cola sales in the United States appeared to have plateaued. Coke and Pepsi were investing hundreds of millions of dollars to shore up international bottlers operating at low capacity. The companies’ overall growth in soft drink sales were falling short of precedent and of investors’ expectations. Was the fundamental nature of the cola wars changing? Would the parameters of this new rivalry include reduced profitability and stagnant growth— inconceivable under the old form of rivalry? DoOr, were the troubles of the late 1990s just another step in the evolution of two of America’s most successful companies? In 2001, non-cola, non-carbs, and even convenience foods offered diversification and growth potential. Low international per capita soft drink consumption figures hinted at tremendous opportunity in the competition for worldwide â€Å"throat share. † Noted a Coke executive in 2000, â€Å"the cola wars are going to be played now across a lot of different ba ttlefields. †39 38 June Preston, â€Å"Things May Go Better for Coke amid Asia Crisis, Singapore Bottler Says,† Journal of Commerce, June 29, 1998, . A3. 39 Betsy McKay, â€Å"Juiced Up: Pepsi Edges Past Coke, and It has Nothing to Do With Cola,† The Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2000. 15 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. Do Exhibit 1 702-442 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] harvard. edu or 617-783-7860. No U. S. Industry Consumption Statistics 1970 1975 1981 1985 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 Historical Carbonated Soft Drink Consumption Cases (millions) Gallons/capita As a % of total beverage consumption 3,090 22. 7 2. 4 3,780 26. 3 14. 4 5,180 34. 2 18. 7 6,500 40. 3 22. 4 7,914 46. 9 26. 1 8,160 47. 2 26. 3 8,608 50. 0 27. 2 8,952 50. 9 28. 1 9,489 52. 0 28. 8 9,880 54. 0 30. 0 9,930 53. 6 29. 4 9,950 53. 0 29. 0 22. 7 22. 8 18. 5 35. 7 6. 5 5. 2 1. 3 1. 8 26. 3 21. 8 21. 6 33 1. 2 6. 8 7. 3 4. 8 1. 7 2 34. 2 20. 6 24. 3 27. 2 2. 7 6. 9 7. 3 6 2. 1 2 40. 3 24. 0 25. 0 26. 9 4. 5 7. 8 7. 3 6. 2 2. 4 1. 8 46. 9 24. 3 24. 2 26. 2 8. 1 8. 8 7. 0 5. 4 2. 0 1. 5 47. 2 23. 3 23. 8 26. 5 8. 2 9. 1 6. 8 5. 4 2. 0 0. 6 1. 4 50. 0 22. 8 23. 2 23. 3 9. 6 9. 4 7. 1 4. 8 1. 7 0. 9 1. 3 50. 9 22. 3 22. 8 1. 3 10. 1 9. 5 6. 8 4. 9 1. 8 1. 1 1. 2 52. 0 22. 3 22. 7 20. 2 11. 0 9. 7 6. 9 4. 8 1. 8 1. 1 1. 2 54. 0 22. 1 22. 0 18. 0 11. 8 10. 0 6. 9 4. 7 2. 0 1. 3 1. 3 53. 6 22. 2 21. 9 17. 2 12. 6 10. 2 7. 0 4. 6 2. 0 1. 4 1. 3 53. 0 22. 2 21. 7 16. 8 13. 2 10. 4 7. 0 4. 6 2. 0 1. 5 1. 2 114. 5 126. 5 133. 3 146. 2 154. 4 154. 3 154. 0 152. 6 153. 6 154. 1 153. 8 153. 6 68 56 49. 2 36. 3 28. 1 28. 2 28. 5 29. 9 28. 9 28. 4 28. 7 28. 9 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 182. 5 U. S. Liquid Consumption Trends (gallons/capita) Carbonated soft drinksBeer Milk Coffeea Bottled Waterb Juices Teaa Powder ed drinks Wine Sports Drinksc Distilled spirits Subtotal Tap water/hybrids/all others Totald tC opy Source: John C. Maxwell, Beverage Digest Fact Book 2001, and The Maxwell Consumer Report, Feb. 3, 1994; Adams Liquor Handbook, casewriter estimates. aFrom 1985, coffee and tea data are based on a three-year moving average to counter-balance inventory swings, thereby portraying consumption more realistically. bBottled water includes all packages, single-serve, and bulk. cSports drinks included in â€Å"Tap water/hybids/all others† pre-1992. This analysis assumes that each person consumes on average one-half gallon of liquid per day. -16- Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century Advertisement Spending for the Top 10 CSD Brands ($ millions) op y Exhibit 2 Share of market 2000 Total market 20. 4 13. 6 8. 7 7. 2 6. 6 6. 3 5. 3 2. 0 1. 7 1. 1 1999 20. 3 13. 8 8. 5 7. 1 6. 8 3. 6 5. 1 2. 1 1. 8 1. 1 Advertisement Spendinga per 2000 2000 1999 share point 207. 3 13 0. 0 1. 2 50. 5 84. 0 83. 6 0. 5 44. 5 NA 2. 7 148. 9 91. 1 25. 5 37. 1 68. 4 71. 3 0. 8 39. 2 NA 2. 9 tC Coke ClassicPepsi-Cola Diet Coke Mountain Dew Sprite Dr Pepper Diet Pepsi 7UP Caffeine Free Diet Coke Barq’s root beer Total top 10 702-442 72. 9 72. 9 10. 2 9. 6 0. 1 7. 0 12. 7 13. 3 0. 1 22. 3 NA 2. 4 604. 2 485. 2 8. 3 707. 6 650. 0 NA Source: â€Å"Top 10 Soft-Drink Brands,† Advertising Age, September 24, 2001; casewriter estimates. aAdvertisement spending measured in 11 media channels from CMR. Brands and total market in 192-oz cases from Do No Beverage Digest/Maxwell. Case volume from all channels. 17 Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. [email  protected] arvard. edu or 617-783-7860. 702-442 Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century U. S. Soft Drink Market Share by Case Volume (percent) 1966 op y Exhibit 3 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2000E 27. 7 1. 5 1. 4 2. 8 33. 4 28. 4 1. 8 1. 3 3. 2 34. 7 26. 2 2. 6 2. 6 3. 9 35. 3 2

Essay on Eastern Sentiments

Essay on Eastern Sentiments Essay on Eastern Sentiments Essay on Eastern SentimentsEastern Sentiments is the book written by Yi T’aejun on his experience as Korean intellectual living in the country occupied by the foreign superpower, Japan, which had taken the tight control over the nation but still Koreans had preserved the opportunity to develop their culture and maintain their traditions, in spite of the occupation. The book involves the broad scope of different aspects of life described by the author. He shifts from the personal experience to national and regional ones describing the life of the nation and East Asian region under Japanese control. In such a way, the book is a valuable primary source of information on the colonial era and the life of Korean people and East Asia under the Japanese rule.   The experience described by Yi contributes to the better understanding of the colonial policy conducted by Japan on occupied territories and how the population of occupied countries responded to the Japanese rule. Yi reveals the colonial perspective on the life of Korean people under the Japanese rule and how the colonialism affected the life of Korean society and culture, individuals and East Asian region at large.The author narrates the story from the perspective of Korean intellectual, who holds the position in the upper-class in Korean society. Yi was the scientists, who dedicated his life to his scientific work, although he was never sure whether it was work at all. At any rate, in his book he clearly states that he does not really view his actions as the work. Nevertheless, he does his best to describe in details his personal experience of Korea in the time of the Japanese colonization. The colonization was the most significant event that can be clearly traced throughout the book, while Yi seems just to record his experience and makes his observations in the anecdotal form. More important, he does not just narrates the story of colonization but, instead, he gives the retrospection to the Korean pa st allowing readers to compare how he and Koreans lived before and during the colonization.At the same time, the author uncovers the position of Korean upper-class under Japanese occupation. As a representative of the upper-class he is not involved in any manual labor. Instead, he dedicates all his life to scientific works and whatever he likes to do, including gardening, cultural studies and performing other activities which are interesting and important for him in person. His lifestyle and activities were the characteristic of the lifestyle of the representative of the upper-class in Korean society. In this regard, the Japanese occupation and colonization of Korea did not have a considerable impact on the lifestyle of the upper-class of Korea. Instead, they led the same lifestyle. The only change the colonial policy had on the upper-class of Korea was the limitation of access of representatives of the class to the political power of the country and the supremacy of Japan that held the full political authority and power over Korea. On transmitting the political power to Japan, Koreans still preserved their economic privileges and cultural autonomy as long as they remained within their community which Yi defines as the interior space of Koreans during the colonization. Naturally, the Japanese got political and economic preferences as the country that occupied and colonized Japan but the Japanese did not eliminated Korean upper-class or changed the balance of power in the Korean society. The upper-class remained in the privileged position, while lower-classes born the major burden of the occupation which though referred to political and economic fields mainly, while cultural effects were dubious since Koreans   had managed to preserve their culture, while Japanese colonists were respected and Japanese cultural norms and traditions were manifested and supported publicly but it was rather showing-off attempts or manifestations of the respect to Japanese culture than the true admiration and acceptance of Japanese culture by Koreans.The book provides the detailed description of the Korean culture focusing on specific issues which are the characteristic of Korean culture, such as calligraphy. For instance, Yi describes calligraphy is one of the major achievements of Korean culture, which though may be unusual for the western audience, but still it helps to understand better Korean culture of that time and reveals the development of cultural traditions of Korea. Yi writes different anecdotal stories which uncover cultural norms and traditions of Korean people which Koreans preserved, regardless of the Japanese occupation and colonization of the country by the foreign power. In such a way, the writer uncovers the power of Korean culture and impact of traditions on the lifestyle of Koreans. In fact, the book shows that Koreans had preserved their cultural identity during the colonization and Japan had failed to ruin or change the cultural ident ity of Koreans.At this point, it is possible to refer to the personal experience of Yi, who apparently regrets about the past of Korea and he feels nostalgic about the past, when the Choson dynasty ruled Korea. His regrets are the result of his position of a scholar, who held the honorable position in the Korean society (Uchida 2011). He was free not to do any manual labor and was a highly respected person. In such a way, he could focus on his scientific research and explorations.   As a representative of Korean intellectual elite, Yi had preserved his cultural identity throughout the occupation and colonial time. He remained Korean all his life and the Japanese occupation had never changed his identity. Therefore, the author implies that other Koreans also had preserved their cultural identity during the colonial time. Such a preservation of the cultural identity of Koreans proves that Japan has proved to be either unable or unwilling to set absolutely new ideology in the coloniz ed territories (Randall188). The author describes the colonial experience of Koreans as the ‘mild’ colonization that may be unusual for western readers, who have the reading experience related to the colonial experience during the Nazi rule in Europe, when Nazi Germany imposed the fascist ideology on occupied territories eliminating any forms of opposition or difference (Uchida 2011). Even though Japan also enhanced fascist ideology, its impact was not overwhelming in Korea and the local population had preserved the cultural identity that was different from that of Japan.The author describes traditions and lifestyle of Korean people focusing on the life of representatives of the upper-class mainly, although he includes the description of other classes too (Wells 4). The theme of the life of a scientist in Korea of the 1930s is one of the main themes of his book. The life of the scientist in Korea was the life of the representative of the upper-class, who was free of the manual labor and had plenty opportunities to conduct his scientific studies as was the case of Yi.At the same time, Yi is not a narrowly nationalist in his writing concerning the socio-cultural environment he lived in. Instead, he has elaborated a broader view on the development of Korean and East Asian culture. In fact, he conducts the exploration of East Asian culture focusing on Chinese poetry, Japanese literature and culture. The broader view on the colonial policy and occupation of East Asian countries by Japan allows revealing the essence of colonial policies of Japan on occupied territories. The author views the colonization not as a mere occupation of Korea by Japan but as a part of the large scale expansionist policy conducted by Japan which was driven by its imperialist ambitions, while fascism served as the ideological ground for the territorial expansion of Japan and occupation of Korea and other countries in East Asia.   In such a way, Yi viewed Korea and Korean cult ure in the context of the East Asian culture. Therefore, he has managed to overcome national boundaries and has had a broader view on Korean culture in the context of East Asian one. Yi has managed to show the cultural development of East Asian countries under the Japanese rule. Yi estimates that other countries also tended to share Korean experience of colonization and Japan conducted similar policies in other countries of the East Asian region.In this regard, the colonial impact of Japan played probably an important part in the development of the worldview of the author because the occupation of Korea by Japan opened new broader perspectives on Korean and East Asian culture. Hence, the Japanese occupation contributed to the broadening of the eyesight of the author. As a result, he viewed the historical and cultural development of East Asia not from the sheer Korean perspective but from the East Asian or universal one.At the same time, the author uncovers the considerable impact of Japanese culture on Korea and population of occupied countries but this impact was basically limited to the political control and economic privileges of Japanese on occupied territories. In addition, the population of occupied territories viewed Japanese culture as mainstream but still they preserved their cultural identity and maintained their cultural norms and traditions.   However, the experience of the life of Korean people under the Japanese occupation reveals a number of noteworthy facts which reveal the substantial difference of Korean occupational experience with that of European countries during World War II, for example.Along with the profound attention to the cultural life of Korean and East Asian society, he focused on the broader scope of his description of social and cultural life of his time. In fact, his narrative is the detailed description of people living in his time, their problems, issues that were important for them. In such a way, his narrative reveals the modernity which Yi describes in details and readers feel the spirit of his epoch and the life of people living in Korea and East Asia in the 1930s.Yi also conducted the study of literature during the 1930s, which also saw the rise of Japanese fascism. The author uncovers the transformation of Japanese literature during the 1930s reveal clearly the trend to the emergence of fascism in Japan. The trend to the rise of faschism in Japan grew stronger along with the aggressive foreign polices of Japan. In such a way, the author gives insights into the essence of colonial policies as impersialist ones, while the occupation and colonization of new territories were justified by the fascist ideology which laid the foundation to expansionist policies of Japan.At the same time, he manifested his opposition to Japan publishing some avant-garde writers, although he had never openly opposed to Japan or criticized it publicly. In such a way, he remain devoted to his Korean cultural norms and trad itions, assisted the development of Korean literature and culture but formally or publicly remained loyal or, at the most, indifferent, to Japan.Social inequality was beneficial for the wealthy, upper class and even the occupation of Korea by Japan did not have absolutely destructive impact on their position (Yi, 185). In such a way, social inequality becomes one of the main themes of his books, which though is not always intentionally presented by the author. On the contrary, the social inequality becomes obvious from the context, as Yi uncovers his own life, as the life of the representative of the upper-class. On conveying his personal experience, Yi shows how different was his life from the life of the average people in Korea as well as other East Asian countries.At the same time, the author pays attention to the theme of the life and work of a scientist in Korean society of his time. He uncovers this theme because it is apparently close to him as a scientist. Being scientist hi mself, Yi shows that he did not suffer the severe oppression during the colonial time. Even though he regrets about the past, he does it just because he regrets about the Korean dynasty which he considered to be better for him because he liked their policies better than Japanese one, although such preferences may be the result of his patriotism rather than the quality and effects of policies conducted by the Japanese (Uchida 2011).However, one of the main themes of the book is the theme of occupation. At this point, it is quite noteworthy to compare the occupation of Korea by Japan and the occupation of western countries. For instance, the occupation of western countries is traditionally depicted as the severe oppression and full suppression of national movements, elite, and cultures. The Japanese occupation was milder than western one judging from the book written by Yi, who depicts the Japanese occupation of Korea as the ‘mild’ occupation compared to western perceptio n of occupation. Yi reveals the fact that, in spite of suppression from the part of Japanese, the local, i.e. Korean, upper-class still maintained its position.At this point, it is worth mentioning the fact that Yi distinguishes private and public spaces in colonized countries. Referring to the Korean experience, he insists that colonized nations tend to develop interior spaces, where they maintain their cultural norms and traditions. At the same time, there is the public sphere controlled by colonizer.   More important, there was no direct suppression of Korean culture by Japanese one as was the case of European occupational policies conducted by the Nazi Germany, for instance, which imposed German culture and rules on occupied territories (Wells 17).   In contrast to Japan the Nazi attempted to control all spheres of social life suppressing any manifestation of opposition or devotion to non-Nazi norms and traditions (Wells 17).Furthermore, Yi uses anecdotal essays as a popular form of narration which attracted the audience and made the book interesting for the large audience, including not only those, who are interested in Korea and Asia studies, but also the average readers, who want to explore new horizons and learn more about different countries of the world. In such a way, the author uncovers the impact of the colonization through anecdotal stories which depicted different episodes from the life of Yi and life of other people.Thus, the book Eastern Sentiments by Yi T’aejun reveals the experience of the writer, who depicts his life and the life of Koreans under Japanese occupation. At the same time, the author offers a broad view on the colonial policy of Japan and its impact on East Asian countries. In this regard, the author reveals the fact that Koreans had preserved their cultural identity, in spite of the colonization, but they had to develop dubious models of behavior. On the one hand, they retained their interior space, where they remain ed fully devoted to their Korean traditions, cultural norms and standards. On the other hand, there was the public domain, where Koreans had to manifest their loyalty to the Japanese and Japanese culture. Nevertheless, Korean culture and the upper-class maintained their pre-colonial position mainly, while the colonization had   had the most significant impact on the political and economic life of occupied territories.